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Selling to Conspicuous Consumers:
Pricing, Production and Sourcing Decisions1
Necati Tereyağoğlu, Senthil Veeraraghavan
February 2010.
The Wharton School, The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA 19104. USA
Abstract
Consumers often purchase goods that are “hard-to-find” to conspicuously display their ex-
clusivity and social status. Firms that produce such conspicuously consumed goods such as
designer apparel, fashion goods, jewelry, mobile electronic devices, etc., often face challenges in
making optimal pricing and production decisions. Marketing and retail managers of such firms
are confronted with precipitous tradeoff between high sales volume and high margins, due to the
highly uncertain market demand, strategic consumer behavior, and the display of conspicuous
consumption. In this paper, we propose a model that addresses pricing and production deci-
sions for a firm, using the rational expectations framework. We show that, in equilibrium, firms
may offer high availability of goods despite the presence of conspicuous consumption. We also
provide conditions under which scarcity or stockout strategies could be successfully adopted to
improve profits. Finally, unlike prices, availability information is not easily verifiable. Therefore,
to credibly commit to scarcity strategy, firms can adopt sourcing strategies, such as sourcing
from an expensive production location/supplier, installing complex production process, or using
expensive raw materials all of which may signal deeper investment in unit production costs.
Keywords: Strategic Customer Behavior, Game Theory, Conspicuous Consumption, Pricing,
Scarcity, Sourcing.
1. Introduction
Consumers looking to signal their uniqueness and exclusivity, have often expressed them by con-
suming goods prominently to display their status. Firms that design and sell luxury products or
innovative gadgets have often desired exclusivity in their looks and design. The prominent display
of logos, limited availability and expensive designs are some ways through which firms have dis-
played their exclusivity. For instance, the “Big Pony” apparel designed by Ralph Lauren, have
more prominent logos that could be displayed conspicuously by the wearer.2 Many luxury watches
with intricate designs, such as Piaget, are sold only through limited number of boutique stores and
authorized retailers in the United States (www.piaget.com). Firms often face decisions on how to
make production and pricing decisions when selling such conspicuous goods.
1We thank the faculty of Operations and Information Management, and Marketing departments at the Wharton
School. We thank the seminar participants at the 2009 MSOM Conference at MIT, Revenue Management and
Pricing Workshop at Kellogg, and the 2009 INFORMS Annual Meeting at San Diego. Our sincere acknowledgements
to Fishman-Davidson Center for financial support.
2A comparison between Classic-Fit Polo and the more conspicuous Classic-Fit Big Pony Polo shirts on
http://www.ralphlauren.com shows the big pony designs being sold at higher prices.
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We study the decisions of a firm when there is conspicuous consumption, i.e., when some
members of the population are motivated by invidious comparison (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996).
Invidious comparison refers to situations in which a member of a customer class consumes conspicu-
ously to distinguish himself from other members. We examine the cases when some consumers seek,
purchase and consume hard-to-find products to display their distinction from the other consumers
in the population. Consistent with the literature (Leibenstein 1950, Amaldoss and Jain 2005a), we
term customers that are driven by such invidious comparisons as engaging in snobbish behavior.
With increasingly unpredictable market demand conditions, many firms face difficult tradeoffs
between profits and exclusivity which puts them in a bind. Some firms adopt the strategy to
compete on prices, and hope to increase revenues through sales volume. In recent times, retailers
such as Nordstorm have attributed their increased revenues to slashed prices and increased inventory
availability.3 On the other hand, other firms have chosen to limit their product availability by
creating scarcity, and such shortages for new products have been commonly observed (Gumbel
2007).
In general, a reduction in product availability leads to reduced sales, which may hurt firm
profits. Thus, it is still unclear if the firms should use scarcity strategies in selling goods, and if
they do so, when those strategies should be implemented. Thus, both from practitioner and research
perspectives, it is imperative to understand how firms should make interconnected decisions such
as how much of the good to produce, how to price those goods, and when to invest in innovative
designs or use an expensive supplier, etc.
In this paper, we analyze a monopolist firm’s decisions in a market with uncertain demand from
conspicuous consumers. The firm sells a single conspicuous good to a market consisting of uncertain
number of snobs and commoners. The firm has to make its pricing and the production quantity
decisions, based on the forward-looking consumer behavior. When the demand in not deterministic,
it is difficult to point out if scarcity occurred due to an unexpected high demand (a random
realization) or due to decidedly low inventory (a strategic decision). Often, it is difficult to separate
the two effects, due to the lack of full information on the production process (unobservability).4
3Nordstorm CEO David Spatz argued for cutting prices of several products to respond effectively to the market.
For instance, handmade Anyi Lu designer shoes sold at less than $400, instead of the regular retail price $595 which
was accompanied by 69% increase in store inventory (Giacobbe 2009).
4Over the last few years shortages have been widely observed for game consoles with significant accompanying
speculation. There was widespread speculation that Nintendo was deliberately creating shortages for Wii (Dubner
2007). GameStop COO Dan DeMatteo publicly theorized that “[Nintendo] intentionally dried up supply” (Huang
2007). Nintendo argued that the shortages occurred because the demand turned out to be higher than the forecast
(Kohler 2007). Similar speculation and claims were repeated for Xbox 360 shortages (Duncan 2008). In all the cases,
the inventory and availability information remained fully or partially unobservable.
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This is a key focal point of our approach. We show that indeed scarcity strategy could emerge
in equilibrium in such markets due to the presence of demand uncertainty coupled with demand
externalities.
Our model uses the rational expectations framework (Muth 1961, Stokey 1981) to analyze
conspicuous consumption. This concept has been used in some recent Marketing and Operations
papers (See for instance, Amaldoss and Jain (2005a), Jerath et al (2009), Su (2007).). Our research
bridges some key marketing and operational decisions by considering an analytical model of pricing
and production when customers express their propensity for exclusivity through their purchase
behavior.
The scheme of our paper is as follows. We position our contributions with respect to extant
literature in Section 2. We build the model of the firm and analyze its equilibrium pricing and
production decisions in a homogenous market in Section 3, and heterogenous market in Section 4.
In Section 4.1, we show that our structural insights hold even if the conspicuous consumers are not
forward-looking. Using our structural results, we consider strategic “scarcity” decisions in Section
5, and how firms can resort to increased sourcing costs to signal their commitment to scarcity
strategies in Section 6.
2. Our position in the literature
Many new products – gadgets such as Playstation portables, fashion apparel and goods (designer
brands), new cellular phones, portable electronic devices such as MacBook Air – are often treated as
vehicles of self-expression through which consumers exhibit their desire for exclusivity or conformity.
How should firms produce and market these new products? Analyzing the impact of conspicuous
consumption on firms’ decision has been gaining traction in the recent literature.
Economists and Marketing Researchers have long been interested in how consumer decision-
making related to a purchase could be dependent on social factors. Recently, there has also been
emergent interest in the operations management literature, on how production decisions are im-
pacted by consumers decision making behavior (within the rational framework). This paper bridges
the marketing and operational decisions of a firm when it sells to consumers who involve in con-
spicuous consumption, and notes how operational decisions in sourcing and production investment
can be employed together with marketing strategies such as scarcity strategies.
Economics Literature: Economists have pointed out how consumption could be beset with
positive externalities, due to social conformity in the context of restaurant choice (Becker 1991),
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due to network effects in the context of technology (Katz and Shapiro 1985), due to market frenzies
(DeGraba 1995), or due to herd behavior (Bikhchandani et al 1992).
However, the notion of consumers purchasing goods to be conspicuous dates back to Veblen
(1899) who, in his “The Theory of the leisure class”, wrote how individuals consumed highly
conspicuous goods and services in order to advertise their wealth or social status. Leibenstein
(1950) emphasized the significance of social factors in consumption, and argued that price by itself
might enhance utility. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) argue that the relationship between price and
demand should emerge in equilibrium, and derive conditions for such “Veblen effects” to arise in
equilibrium. Corneo and Jeanne (1997) establish that conspicuous consumption might emerge as a
tool to signal wealth. While economics literature has focussed on when Veblen effects may emerge
in market equilibrium, the pricing and demand management decisions of a firm facing conspicuous
consumers have been relatively underexplored.
Marketing Literature: In a series of papers, Amaldoss and Jain (2005a, 2005b) were the first to
model the marketing decisions related to consumer conspicuous consumption behavior. Amaldoss
and Jain (2005a) study the pricing decision of a firm facing deterministic price-dependent demand,
and show that snobs may exhibit upwards sloping demand curve, only in a heterogenous market.
They conduct laboratory experiments that confirm the equilibrium price derived from the model.
In Amaldoss and Jain (2005b), the pricing problem related to the model is analyzed for a duopoly.
Finally, Amaldoss and Jain (2007) show that addition of costly features to a product can increase
profits in a market with reference group effects. Recent research on shortages of goods as a mar-
keting strategy is also relevant to our paper. Stock and Balachander (2005) provide a signaling
strategy to explain product shortages to sell ‘hot’ products in a market with quality uncertainty.
Balachander and Stock (2009) provide strategic directions on when to offer “limited products” as
a part of the product line.
In contrast, we explore a market with conspicuous consumption and uncertain demand. Both
pricing and production decisions need to be made before a random demand is realized. In such a
market, in the absence of signaling explanations, we show that scarcity strategy could emerge in
the market due to the presence of demand uncertainty.
Further, it is difficult to separate if scarcity occurred due to a strategic decision or missed
forecasts. Therefore, we offer a signaling explanation for high investment: A firm can credibly
commit to scarcity strategy by sourcing or producing its goods in a more expensive production
channel, even without reference group effects, due to demand uncertainty. Increased sourcing
costs signal an ex ante commitment to exclusivity and low production volumes from the firm.
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More importantly, we show such decisions are credible and consistent ex post (i.e. firm does not
overproduce goods after demand realization).
Operations Literature: While operations management literature has a tradition in modeling
demand uncertainties, the interest in modeling strategic consumer behavior is recent and gaining
increased attention. The operational impact of forward-looking or strategic customers have been
considered in variety of contexts such as seasonal goods (Aviv and Pazgal 2008), commitment in
supply chain performance (Su and Zhang 2008), triggering early purchases (Liu and van Ryzin
2008), measuring salvage value (Cachon and Kok 2008), price-match guarantees (Lai et al 2009),
and quick response strategy (Cachon and Swinney 2009). There has been some recent interest in
Operations in understanding how inventory shortages (Debo and van Ryzin 2009) or long queues
(Debo and Veeraraghavan 2009) may signal quality. None of the above papers in this stream
of literature consider conspicuous consumption. We believe our work establishes how scarcity
strategies could emerge in equilibrium in stochastic demand environments. We now detail our
contributions to the extant literature.
• We build an analytical framework for a firm making joint operational and marketing deci-
sions (viz. pricing, production quantity and sourcing strategy), when selling to a market with
uncertain demand and when consumers exhibit strategic purchasing behavior and/or conspicuous
consumption. Our equilibrium results hold under general conditions of demand uncertainty.
•While it has been shown that scarcity can be a strategy to signal quality (Stock and Balachan-
der 2005), it is unclear if scarcity can lead to improved profits when there is no quality uncertainty
in the market. Scarcity necessarily implies a reduction in product availability, and therefore a
reduction in unit sales. We show that demand uncertainty coupled with conspicuous consumption
can indeed lead to market conditions where products are scarce and the firm makes higher profits.
Therefore, consumption externalities and demand uncertainty alone can drive the scarcity strategy
of a firm.
• We show that scarcity strategy is beneficial to the firm when the fraction of consumers
engaging in conspicuous consumption (‘snobs’) is neither too high nor too low. When there are too
few snobs in the market, the firm decides to sell to everyone at lower prices. When there are too
many snobs in the market, the attractive profit margins trigger the firm to overcommit to large
production quantities, to minimize the ‘lost sales’. As a result, the product would not be scarce.
• We show that when selling to markets with conspicuous consumption, due to increased mar-
gins, firms may overproduce goods compared to its production decision in a market without such
conspicuous consumption. Therefore, surprisingly, there may be fewer stockouts in a market in
5
which sufficient number of consumers prefer exclusivity. For instance, if the market is composed of
snobs, it may be optimal for the firm to overproduce, even more than it would produce in a market
in which all strategic consumer behavior is ignored. This finding contrasts starkly with the extant
literature, which show that conspicuous consumption and strategic buying lead to a reduction in
production quantities.
• Finally, firms that sell to consumers exhibiting conspicuous consumption may resort to expen-
sive sourcing or increased production costs. In such cases, firms deliberately source the good from
a more expensive location, or use a costlier supplier, and/or use more expensive raw material com-
ponents in producing the good.5 Often inventory commitment is not fully verifiable by consumers.
A firm can credibly commit to its scarcity strategy, by marketing its sourcing strategy. If products
are produced through an expensive process, it is unlikely that the firm can invest in upfront costs
to produce too many units of the good. Therefore, consumers believe that the product is likely to
be scarce, which drives up the valuation for snobs in the market.
3. Pricing and Production in a Homogenous Market
This paper builds on the classical newsvendor production model for a monopolist firm. Our model
involves a single producer (a monopolist firm) who has to make two decisions – production quantity,
Q, and the price charged per unit, p, – before a random demand, D, is realized in a market composed
of non-atomistic customers. The demand is distributed with cumulative distribution function FD,
with density function fD.6 The firm incurs a constant marginal cost, c, per unit produced. If
the firm produces more than the realized demand, it will be able to salvage the remaining leftover
inventory at a lower price, s, at the end of the selling period (i.e., during the salvage period). In
line with the extant models, the cost of production is higher than the salvage value, i.e., c > s. Let
x+ denotes max(x, 0). The firm’s expected profit can be written as,
ΠN (Q, p) = E[p ·min(D,Q) + s · (Q−D)+ − c ·Q]
= (p− s) · E[min(D,Q)]− (c− s) ·Q (1)
5In Operations Literature, sourcing exclusively from a more expensive supplier has been considered an unviable
strategy unless the supplier has faster delivery times or better reliability (Tomlin 2006). In those cases, an expensive
supply source is sparingly used as an expeditious alternative.
6We assume that demand distribution FD has increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR, Lariviere 2005). This
is a mild assumption that fits many distributions including the Normal distribution, the Uniform distribution, the
Gamma distribution, and the Weibull distribution. We suppress subscript D and use F (·) to denote FD(·) when it is
unambiguous. Further, let F̄ (·) denote 1− F (·).
6
We assume that all the customers have the same valuation, v, for the newly introduced product.7
We begin with a model of a market without any strategic behavior or conspicuous consumption. If
the customers are not strategic, the optimal production quantity and price are set as per newsvendor
decision (see Cachon and Terwiesch 2008).
p0 = v FD(Q0) = (p0 − c)/(p0 − s). (2)
Henceforth, the p0 and Q0 shall be referred to as the traditional newsvendor price and quantity.
However, customers are strategic, i.e, the customers recognize that if the product remains unsold
it would be available in the salvage market at price s. The decision of the strategic customer in the
market is to maximize her individual surplus by choosing whether to buy the product in the selling
period, or to buy the product later in the salvage period. We term such a customer as a strategic
customer (Su and Zhang 2008).
For simplicity (and staying consistent with extant literature), we assume that there is a sell-
ing period during which the product sells at some price p. The prices are observed by the cus-
tomers, however, the actual production quantity remains unobserved. Since the inventory re-
mains unobserved, each strategic customer has to form a belief over the expectation not be-
ing able to find the product, i.e., the stockout probability εs, during the selling period. Based
on these expectations, the customer’s expected surplus if she faces an actual regular price p is
Ustrategic = max{v − p, (1− εs) · (v − s)}. We apply rational expectations (Muth 1961) to solve for
the equilibrium price and production quantity chosen by the firm in this environment.
3.1 Modeling Conspicuous Consumption
Customers, in addition to being strategic (or forward looking), may also exhibit conspicuous con-
sumption. As per Leibenstein (1950) and Amaldoss and Jain (2005a), we address these customers
as snobs. In this section, we begin the analysis with a market composed solely of strategic cus-
tomers who exhibit conspicuous consumption. We extend this assumption to include heterogeneous
markets in Section 4. Snobs have a higher utility for consuming a product when they figure that
other consumers are unable to consume the same product. Suppose a firm produces a good in very
limited amounts. If snobs acquire the product and consume it, they will be seen as the select few
members in the market who consume such a scarce good (i.e., their consumption is conspicuously
observed), which in turn increases their utility for such products.
7To eliminate trivial outcomes, we assume that the customer will value a product more than its cost of production,
i.e., v > c.
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As before, we assume that the actual quantities produced by the firm for the market remains
unobservable to the snobs.8 Thus, belief on product availability is one important factor that snobs
can use to exhibit their conspicuous consumption. Based on their beliefs on product availability,
they seek out hard-to-find products, and derive a higher utility in their exclusiveness.
A consumer might build her belief on availability through two observations: First, she observes
that the shelf space dedicated to the product at a retailer is often empty or running low. Second, she
deciphers, through information accrual, that many other customers are trying to locate the product,
but often facing stockouts. Together, the general non-availability of the product increases her utility
for the product, although it might be equally hard for her to get the product. Mathematically,
we integrate this snobbishness to her utility function based on the stockout belief εs as Usnob =
max{v + k · εs − p, (1 − εs) · (v − s)}, where k represents the sensitivity to stockouts. It measures
a consumer’s responsiveness to the product scarcity.9 For a snob, the higher the value of k is, the
higher the utility she gets from purchasing the product on the observation of a stock-out. There is
substantial evidence from literature on how stockouts may improve a customer’s utility, or enhance
her preference for the product (see Lynn 1991 and references therein).
Note that the firm does not observe the exact valuation a customer possesses for its product.
Therefore, the firm has to develop beliefs over the customers’ reservation price for the product.
We denote the firm’s (seller’s) belief over the reservation price as εr. Based on εr, it chooses the
price optimally, and will produce the corresponding optimal quantity to maximize its profits. A
customer’s problem is then to decide on whether she should buy the product in the selling period,
or in the salvage period. She buys in the selling period, if and only if v+k ·εs−p ≥ (1−εs) ·(v−s).
This leads to the snob’s actual reservation price, r = εs · (k + v − s) + s. We are ready to define
the rational expectations equilibrium (RE equilibrium) in our model.
Definition 1. A RE equilibrium (p,Q, r, εs, εr) satisfies the following conditions: (i) p = εr,
(ii) Q = argmaxq ΠN (q, p), (iii) r = εs · (k + v − s) + s, (iv) εs = F̄ (Q), (v) εr = r.
Conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) assert that, under expectations εr and εs, the firm and all consumers
will rationally act to maximize their utilities. Condition (iv) specifies that, in equilibrium, the
8Many firms produce exclusive goods to sell to snobs. Sometimes, firms announce the exact quantities (Liverpool
FC commemorative phones, Sung 2009). More often, firms do not. For instance, precise Xbox360 shipments remained
unannounced despite widespread shortages (Morris 2005). Often being proprietary, inventory and shipment quantities
are often not easily verifiable information, because the production process remains unobserved by customers.
9There is some evidence that even snobbish customers are price-sensitive, and wait for a good deal (Rice 2010).
Firms such as bluefly.com engage in salvage markets for luxury goods. In any case, our results hold even if snobs are
myopic, and not forward-looking in their purchase behavior (See §4.1).
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stockout expectations εs must match with the actual probability of not being able to find the
product (consistency conditions).
Consider a customer who is indifferent between buying in the first period and waiting to buy in
the salvage period. Since she knows that every other customer is also strategic and snobbish, she
builds a belief on availability of the product. She rationalizes that other customers who are trying
to buy the product face the same stockout probabilities as she does. Since we assume homogeneous
non-atomistic decision makers, the mass of remaining customers is D if the realization of the
demand is D. Thus, she faces a possibility of stock-out, P (D > Q), which must be consistent with
her belief εs, as stated by (iv). Finally, condition (v) requires that the firm correctly predicts snob’s
reservation price.
Conditions in Definition 1 can be reduced to conditions in p and Q only: p = F̄ (Q)·(k+v−s)+s
and Q = argmaxqΠN (q, p). With the aforementioned conditions, we are ready to describe the RE
equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. In the RE equilibrium all customers can buy immediately, and the firm’s price
and quantity choices are characterized by
p∗s = s+
√
(k + v − s)(c− s), F̄D(Q∗s) =
√
c− s
k + v − s
All proofs are deferred to the Appendix. We use p∗s and Q
∗
s to denote the equilibrium price
and quantity decision the firm makes, (and subscript s in general), when it chooses to sell the
product based on snobs’ reservation prices. For the purposes of benchmarking, we compare the
optimal production decision in the case when conspicuous consumption is present in the market to
the case when it is absent. When the consumers in the market do not exhibit any sensitivity to
stockouts, i.e., when there is no conspicuous consumption, we have k = 0. In this case, Corollary
2 indicates how the previous results on strategic customers (cf Su and Zhang 2008) in a market
without conspicuous consumption, emerges as a special case of our problem.
Corollary 2. In the RE equilibrium, the firm’s price and quantity choices in the absence of con-
spicuous consumption are characterized by
pc = s+
√
(v − s)(c− s), F̄D(Qc) =
√
c− s
v − s
.
The comparison of the equilibrium price and quantity in our model to the results without
conspicuous consumption (Su and Zhang 2008) reveals the following relationships.
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• The equilibrium price when faced with snobs, p∗s, turns out to be higher than the equilibrium
price choice when faced with just strategic customers, pc. This reaffirms our intuition.
• Intriguingly, the equilibrium production quantity, when conspicuous consumption is present,
Q∗s, is higher than the equilibrium production, Qc (when there is no conspicuous consump-
tion).10 The firm ‘overproduces’ due to higher margins (underage costs). Just because con-
sumers exhibit conspicuous consumption does not imply that the consequent production
quantities would be low. In fact, as customers become more snobbish (i.e., their valuation
increases significantly due to stockouts), the equilibrium stockout probability falls. This
is illustrated in Figure 1(b) where equilibrium stockout probability decreases steadily with
sensitivity to stockouts.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium quantities (left panel, a) and stock-out probabilities P (D > Q) (right
panel, b) are plotted with respect to the sensitivity to stockouts, k for various markets. The curved
line represents the market with conspicuous consumption (i.e., Q∗s in the left figure and P (D > Q
∗
s)
in the right figure). The horizontal dotted line represents the market with strategic customers with
no conspicuous consumption (Qc in figure (a) and P (D > Qc) in (b)). The thick horizontal line
represents the regular newsvendor model (Q0 in figure (a) and P (D > Q0) in (b)). For illustrative
purposes, the demand distribution is N(µ = 60, σ2 = 100), and the parameters are v = 20, c = 10,
s = 5.
Finally, note that production quantity when customers are just strategic is lower than the
10Notice that Q∗s > Qc because F̄ (Qc) =
√
c−s
v−s >
√
c−s
k+v−s = F̄ (Q
∗
s).
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regular production quantity, i.e., Qc < Q0. Hence, given that Q∗s > Qc, it is unclear whether under
conspicuous consumption the production quantities are lower or higher than the regular production
quantity. In the sequel, this comparative analysis aids us in describing product scarcity.
A comparison of the equilibrium price and quantity choices in our model with those in the clas-
sical newsvendor model11 reveals the dependency of the relationship on the sensitivity to stockouts
due to conspicuous consumption. This is summarized in Lemma 3 (and in Figures 1(a) and 1(b)).
Lemma 3. i ) Q∗s < Q0 and p
∗
s < p0 when k <
(v−s)·(v−c)
c−s
ii ) Q∗s > Q0 and p
∗
s > p0 when k >
(v−s)·(v−c)
c−s
The firm facing snobs produces less quantity than it would in the traditional newsvendor setting
if the sensitivity to stockouts, k, is low. If the sensitivity to stockouts is high, the firm produces
more than it would in the traditional newsvendor setting. We define this unique threshold level of
sensitivity to stockouts, (v−s)·(v−c)c−s , to discuss where scarcity strategy might be profitable to apply.
Thus, even though consumers exhibit strategic buying behavior and conspicuous consumption,
we find that the firm may not necessarily produce less inventory. This result stands in contrast to the
extant results which show that the production quantity in strategic customer market is always less
than the regular newsvendor quantity. The higher margins that can be accrued from conspicuous
consumers, make the firm ‘overcommit’ to higher production volume, more so than it would if
those consumers were not conspicuous consumers. Thus accounting for marketing behaviors, such
as pricing under conspicuous consumption, impacts other areas of the firm and leads to distinct
operational decisions.
4. Heterogenous Market (Snobs and Commoners)
In this section, we address firms’ strategies in a heterogenous market. The market is composed of
two different types of customers, whom we term as snobs and commoners (cf. Leibenstein 1950).
We use β to denote the fraction of customer population who are snobs. The rest of the population
(1−β) is composed of commoners. A commoner is distinguished from a snob in the following sense:
A commoner does not exhibit any inclination for conspicuous consumption, but she may still be
strategic in her decision-making.
Both types of customers (snobs and commoners) are willing to buy the product in the selling
period as long as the firm does not charge a price higher than their own reservation price. Since there
11p0 = v and F̄ (Q0) =
c−s
v−s .
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are two possible reservation prices12 within the market, the firm will have two possible consistent
quantity choices, and this will in turn affect the equilibrium availability and beliefs (εs).
Thus, there are two possible candidates for the RE equilibrium. The firm charges one of the
reservation prices based on the percentage of snobs and produces an optimal quantity that will
make the expectations of the customers consistent. Thereafter, the customers observe the price
and decide whether to buy the product in the selling period.
Definition 2. When the firm charges the snob’s (commoner’s) reservation price, an RE equilibrium
(p,Q, r, εs, εr) satisfies the following conditions: (i) p = εr, (ii) Q = argmaxq ΠN (q, p), (iii) r =
εs · (k + v − s) + s (r = εs · (v − s) + s), (iv) εs = F̄βD(Q)
(
εs = F̄D(Q)
)
, (v) εr = r.
The conditions imposed in Definition 2 are the same as those imposed in Definition 1 except
for the conditions (iii) and (iv). Those conditions relate to the beliefs on the reservation price and
product availability. The total mass of the customers who are in the market for the product will
vary based on the price charged by the firm, and therefore the beliefs on stockouts and reservation
prices will also change.
If the firm prices the product based on its belief of snobs’ reservation price, then only snobs
are present in the market to purchase the product (since the high price rules out commoners
from buying the product). Thus, the random variable D is rescaled from D to βD and stockout
probability becomes P (βD > Q) or simply, F̄βD(Q). The corresponding equilibrium production
quantity is given by Proposition 4(1).
On the other hand, if the firm charges the commoner’s reservation price, the mass of the
customers in the market remains identical to the initial demand distribution, since the offered price
is lower than everyone’s reservation price. In this case, a possibility of stock-out stays the same as
in Definition 1, P (D > Q). This is indicated in Proposition 4(2).
Proposition 4. 1. (Limited Production) In the RE equilibrium under limited production,
only snobs can buy, and the firm’s price and quantity choices are characterized by P (β ·D >
Q∗s) =
√
c−s
k+v−s and p
∗
s =
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) + s.
2. (Regular Production) In the RE equilibrium, all customers (snobs & commoners) can buy,
and the firm’s price and quantity decisions are characterized by P (D > Qc) =
√
c−s
v−s and
p∗c =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) + s.
12i)r = εs · (k + v − s) + s for snobs and ii)r = εs · (v − s) + s for commoners
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Depending on the market parameters, the profit-maximizing firm would adopt one of the afore-
mentioned strategies. Since consumers are rational, and can correctly form expectations about
firm’s strategies, the corresponding RE equilibrium would emerge. We investigate the two candi-
date strategies to see when limited production or regular production would be preferred by the firm.
We use Π∗N,s to denote the firm’s optimal profit obtained under the Limited Production strategy
(selling only to snobs), and Π∗N,c to denote the firm’s optimal profit obtained under the Regular
Production strategy (selling to snobs and commoners).
The ensuing Lemma 5 sheds more light on when the firm chooses Limited Production and sells
only to snobs, and when it tries to adopt the Regular Production strategy to cover the whole market
(subject to demand uncertainty).
Lemma 5. There exists a unique threshold of snobs, β∗, where Π∗N,s < Π
∗
N,c when β ≤ β∗, and
Π∗N,s > Π
∗
N,c when β > β
∗.13
Lemma 5 shows the firm may adopt different policies based on the concentration of conspicuous
consumption in the market. The decision depends on the threshold fraction of snobs in the market
(β∗). If the number of snobs in the market is low (i.e. β ≤ β∗), the firm will price the product at the
commoner’s reservation price, and make its product available to all consumers in the market. It does
not pay to exclude the commoners out of the market (by selling the product at the snob’s reservation
price), since the additional profit accrued from the higher price premiums can be compensated by
selling to a significantly larger market at a lower price. However, if there is sufficient presence of
snobs in the market (β > β∗), the firm can adopt the limited production strategy, by attempting to
sell only to the snobs. On average, the firm can afford to sell to snobs at high prices, even though
the volume of sales has been pushed down due to reduced market coverage. (Note that this does not
imply that there would be shortages, since only snobs are in the market, and they might find the
product availability to be high). Thus, equilibria with different characteristics can emerge in the
market, depending on the density of snobs in the market. Proposition 6 provides the expressions
for optimal prices and quantities in the market.
Proposition 6. If β ≤ β∗ then in the RE equilibrium, the firm’s price and quantity choices are
characterized by F̄ (Q∗c) =
√
c−s
v−s and p
∗
c =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) + s, and all customers can buy. How-
ever, if β > β∗ then in the RE equilibrium, the firm’s price and quantity choices are characterized
by F̄βD(Q∗s) =
√
c−s
k+v−s and p
∗
s =
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) + s, and only snobs can buy.
13The unique threshold level is β∗ =
√
v−s
k+v−s ·
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
v−s )
0
ufD(u) du/
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
k+v−s )
0
ufD(u) du
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Serving only to the snobs might also be perceived as “scarcity” strategy, since the firm chooses
to sell only to a fraction of the total population. As discussed previously, we show that this may
not be necessarily true.
The firm’s pricing and production decisions are dictated by two counter-acting factors. First,
selling only to snobs means the average demand in the market is reduced – this means the production
quantity will tend to reduce on average. However, selling only to snobs increases the underage cost
or the product margin, since the product is now marketed to snobs at more expensive prices. This
means that the production quantity will increase. Due to the higher underage cost, more units of
the product are produced to avoid the opportunity cost of missing those high margin sales (lost
sales). These two effects counteract each other. Thus, the resultant production quantity may be
higher or lower than the production quantity when the firm sells to everyone in the market. We
find that if the fraction of snobs in the market is below a certain threshold, the product might be
scarce to find compared to the case when the firm sells the product to all consumer types, i.e., the
probability that product is in-stock is lower. This is captured in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. There exists a unique level of percentage of snobs, βQ, where Q∗s < Qc when
β < βQ and Q∗s > Qc when β > βQ. This threshold level is given by
βQ =
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)
.
Proposition 7 asserts that the strategy of restricting the sales only to snobs does not always
imply the product is scarce to find. In fact, the product might be commonly available even though
the firm covers only the snobs in the market. Consequent to Proposition 7, the product is scarce in
the market only if (i) the product is limited to snobs (Limited Production), and (ii) the production
quantities are lower than the quantities firm produces when it sells to all the market (i.e. Q∗s < Qc).
Thus scarcity exists only when β ∈ (β∗, βQ). We elaborate this interesting finding on scarcity
further in Section 5. Before analyzing scarcity in detail, we establish the robustness of our result,
by showing such “intermediate” scarcity profile continues to exist even when snobs are myopic in
§4.1.
4.1 Heterogenous Market: Myopic Snobs
In this section, customers exhibit conspicuous consumption but they are not strategic. There is
some evidence that a large fraction of snobs waits for the markdowns (Economist 2009). On the
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other hand, perhaps snobs would be willing to pay extreme prices for scarce products to distinguish
themselves from others, and always buy myopically.
Conditions imposed in this market setting are the same as those imposed in Definition 2 except
for the reservation price condition of snobs in (iii). Snobs are myopic in their decision so their
reservation price will change. If the firm prices its good based on its belief of snobs’ reservation
price, then only snobs are present in the market to purchase the product. Then, the random variable
D which stands for the demand is descaled by the scalar β to βD. This changes the actual stockout
probability to P (βD ≥ Q) or simply, F̄βD(Q). On the other hand, if the firm sets the commoner’s
reservation price, the mass of the customers remains identical to the demand distribution, since
the offered price is lower than everyone’s reservation price. In this case, the probability of stockout
stays same as in Definition 2 (P (D ≥ Q)).
Again, we investigate the two candidate strategies to see when each strategy would be preferred
by the firm. The following Proposition 8 sheds light on when the firm adopts the limited production
strategy vs. when it would produce for the entire market. Note that a threshold structure similar
to that established in Section 4 holds, except that the threshold values have changed.
Proposition 8. There exists a unique threshold of snobs, β∗mySn
14,
1. If β < β∗mySn, in the RE equilibrium, the firm’s price and quantity choices are characterized
by F̄ (Qc) =
√
c−s
v−s and pc =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) + s, and all customers will try to buy.
2. If β > β∗mySn, in the RE equilibrium, the firm’s price and quantity choices are characterized
by F̄βD(Q∗mySn) =
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k and p
∗
mySn =
v+s+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2 , and only snobs
will try to buy.
In particular, the threshold for the limited production strategy with myopic snobs is smaller
than the threshold when the snobs are strategic (i.e., β∗mySn < β
∗).15 The firm begins to exclude
the commoners for lower fraction of snobs, since the additional profit accrued from the higher price
premiums (provided by myopic consumption of the snobs) compensates for any loss due to reduced
sales (from selling the product to the snobs only). Therefore, the firm adopts its limited production
strategy in more scenarios. Again as before, scarcity exists only in an intermediate region of β
values even when snobs are myopic. The result is provided in Proposition A4 in the Appendix.
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β∗mySn =
√
(c− s)(v − s)
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
v−s )
0
ufD(u) du/
(v − s) +
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k )
0
ufD(u) du
15Comparing the expressions for β∗mySn and β
∗ in the preceding footnotes.
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5. Analysis of Scarcity Strategies
To discuss scarcity strategies in the market, we first clearly define notion of “scarcity”. We define
a product is scarce, when the total production quantity available in the market with conspicuous
customers, is lower than the optimal quantity that would have been produced for the market (with
an identical demand distribution) in which the customers are forward-looking but do not exhibit
such conspicuous consumption behavior (i.e. Q∗s < Qc).
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Figure 2: The equilibrium production for different (β). For representative illustration, v = 20, c =
10, s = 5, k = 10, and the demand distribution is N(µ = 60, σ2 = 100). The dotted line above
represents the production quantity when customer behavior is entirely ignored. Note that in the
region between β∗ and βQ, the optimal production capacity is lower the production quantity when
all customers are strategic (Qc). This defines the scarcity region. The difference between Qc and
Q∗s, pointed out in the plot denotes the extent or the degree of scarcity in the market.
The equilibrium decisions for different market parameters are captured in Figure 2. When
β ≤ β∗, regular production is adopted to cover the market as much as possible and Qc units are
available in the market. From Lemma 5, when the fraction of snobs in the population exceeds
β∗, the firm switches to selling only to snobs (i.e. Limited Production). As β increases, selling
only to snobs continues to remain the optimal selling strategy. However, note that the production
volume increases since the mean demand (i.e. the fraction of snobs in the market) is increasing.
As a result, if the fraction of snobs in the market is higher than βQ (from Proposition 7), the total
production volume and the availability of products (in-stock probability) are both higher than in
16Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate this notion of scarcity is stricter than simply comparing the equilibrium prices and
production quantity to the standard newsvendor prices and production quantity.
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the case when customers are just strategic. Thus, the in-stock probability for the product is lower
(i.e. the product is scarcer to find) in the intermediate region between β∗ and βQ. Furthermore,
Figure 2 also reveals that the extent of scarcity is the strongest when the fraction of snobs is just
higher than β∗.
5.1 Increased Response to stock-outs
We now study the prevalence of scarcity as the snobs’ sensitivity to stockouts varies. In Figure 3,
we study how scarcity decisions vary with the fraction of snobs in the market, as the sensitivity
to stockouts increases (from k = 10 in Figure 3(a) to k = 45 in Figure 3(b)). We find that when
the market is concentrated with snobs, who are highly sensitive to stockouts (high k), the firm
might produce more quantity than the regular newsvendor quantity in equilibrium (even though
the customers are strategic). Note that these results extend the observations from Lemma 3 which
showed that the equilibrium production may exceed the newsvendor production quantity when the
sensitivity to stockouts is high.
(a) (b)
Figure 3: The equilibrium quantity choice for each possible value of percentage of snobs (β).
Parameters are the same as Figure 2. Increase in responsiveness to stockouts follows by a decrease
in β∗ and an increase in the slope of Q∗s.
Furthermore, as the snobs become more sensitive to stockouts (comparing (a) and (b)), we make
two key observations:
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1. The threshold β∗ decreases with sensitivity to stockouts. If scarcity becomes more desirable
to snobs, the firm is more likely to offer limited production, i.e. when only snobs can buy,
even when the number of snobs in the market is very low. In other words, the firm adopts
the limited production strategy more often.
2. On the converse, the optimal equilibrium production quantity under the limited production
strategy increases more steeply with the fraction of snobs in the market as the sensitivity
to stockouts increases (i.e. slope of the line under limited production strategy increases). If
the snobs respond strongly to stockouts, the reservation prices would be even higher, which
results in higher price (and an increased underage cost). As a result, the production quantities
increase steeply despite the firm adopting a strategy of selling only to snobs. This has the
effect of reducing the degree of scarcity (fewer stockouts).
Lemma 9. For higher k, the equilibrium production quantity Q∗s increases more steeply in β.
Lemma 9 demonstrates that the optimal production quantity increases faster in β as the sen-
sitivity to stockouts are higher. As snobs become more sensitive to stockouts, the firm increases
its production quantities even further since the margins from the sales to snobs has also increased.
Even though snobs are sensitive to stockouts, their willingness to pay more for exclusivity, causes
the firm to produce more goods than usual, since the opportunity cost of losing a sale to such a
customer is very high. In other words, the firm is averse to losing a high margin sale (on those rare
stockouts), and stocks up on inventory, even though it runs the risk of reduced exclusivity amongst
the snobs. Proposition 10 summarizes the behavior of the thresholds with respect to sensitivity of
snobs to stockouts.
Proposition 10. The threshold levels, β∗ and βQ, decrease with increase in sensitivity to stock-out,
k.
Recall that the firm adopts the limited production strategy when the number of snobs in the
market is more than β∗. Proposition 10 indicates that the firm would adopt the limited produc-
tion strategy more often as the sensitivity to stockouts increases in the market for the snobbish
customers. Conversely, Proposition 10 also states that βQ decreases in k. The more sensitive the
snobs are to stockouts, the more likely the strategy of selling to snobs leads to over-production (i.e.
more than the equilibrium quantity produced when the good is available to the whole market).
As seen in Lemma 9, the increased opportunity cost drives the firm into producing more goods.
In other words, the cost of stockouts are high, when the sensitivity of stockouts for snobs is high.
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As a result, the firm produces more goods, even though it is limiting its market to a fraction of
customers (snobs) in the market. Aided with the results of Lemma 9 and Proposition 10, we can
now analyze the region of scarcity.
It is unclear if the scarcity region that exists in the region β ∈ (β∗, βQ) is expanding as snobs
become more receptive to stockouts (i.e. as k increases). Propositon 11 provides conditions under
which the region of scarcity (i.e. βQ − β∗) expands as snobs become more sensitive to stockouts.
Proposition 11. Scarcity region expands if and only if generalized failure rate of the distribution
is greater than a threshold, i.e. g(Q∗s/β) ≥
βQ
β∗M(Q
∗
s/β) where M is a constant dependent on Q
∗
s
and β.17
Proposition 11 provides a condition based on demand variability for the prevalence of stockout
strategy. If the snobs are very sensitive to stockouts, the scarcity strategy is often in equilibrium
if the distribution of the uncertain demand has a high generalized failure rate. Broadly speaking,
demand variability in cohesion with conspicuous consumption plays a strong role in the stockouts
as an optimal strategy.
6. Commitment to Scarcity: Signaling through Sourcing Invest-
ments
While it is true that scarcity strategies can be adopted by firms to generate more revenues,
when the market conditions are favorable, it is far from certain that such shortage information is
credible, especially since the production decisions are often unobservable. For instance, firms can
often stock their shelves as the demand evolves, and it is clear that overall availability is higher, even
though more stockouts are observed on store visits. Amaldoss and Jain (2007) correctly observe
that “limited edition strategy is constrained by the firms’ ability to credibly convince consumers
that it will not sell a higher quantity . . . (since it is ex post profitable to do so)”. In this section,
we study how firms may signal their exclusivity by strengthening their commitment to scarcity
strategies credibly. We show that in equilibrium, the firms may end up with lower production
volume (depending on the market structure), due to higher upfront investments in sourcing costs.
In our model, the firm does not have any additional utility to produce more goods after the demand
is realized, since the reservation price for the remaining consumers is reduced to salvage value s
(i.e., overage cost is incurred on additional units).
17Lariviere (2005) defines g(ξ) = ξfD(ξ)
F̄D(ξ)
as the generalized failure rate of D where D is a non-negative random
variable with distribution FD.
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In particular, we look at the sourcing strategies of the firm and examine how the supply-side
decisions can be employed as signaling devices to indicate possible shortages to the market. Such
strategies are not uncommon in the market. Many luxury apparel firms advertise their products to
be handmade or Italian leather,18 signaling higher value to the customer. Many firms that produce
conspicuous products, such as Timbuk2,19 prominently claim their expensive sourcing decisions to
sell the goods at a higher premium. We argue that in some cases such information may not be
themselves intrinsically valuable to snobs (i.e., snobs may have no additional utility in handmade
bags or shoes made of imported Italian leather). However, such information may be processed by
snobs as being indicative of the firm’s cost-commitment to the product.
Consider a firm that makes a sourcing or production decision for a conspicuous good before the
decisions are made on price and production quantity. The sourcing decision will distinguish the
product from the functionally equivalent product sourced elsewhere. For simplicity, we assume that
there are two possible production methods. The cheaper sourcing method has a marginal cost cL,
and more expensive method involves cH , i.e., cH > cL. The more expensive source might involve a
combination of factors that increase the marginal cost of production - an in-sourced supplier whose
assembling wages are higher, or the utilization of more expensive raw materials, or the employment
of a more-intricate and less-efficient production process.
We consider the decision of the firm and consumers in a multi-period game. In the first period,
the firm makes its sourcing decisions. In the second period, firm and consumers play their strategies:
pricing and quantity decisions are made by the firm before demand is known, and the consumers
make their purchase decisions. This is followed by the period in which left over goods are salvaged.
We derive the RE equilibrium through backward induction. In the second period, given the sourcing
decision, the subgame proceeds exactly identical as analyzed in the previous sections (except that
cL or cH replaces c). Since there are two possible production methods with different marginal
costs, in each subgame, the firm decides the profit maximizing strategy given the sourcing decision.
Then, in the first period, the firm compares the profits obtained from each sourcing decision, and
will choose the alternative that maximizes its profit.
Following Proposition 8, for each source, there is a unique threshold level of percentage of snobs
in the market above which the firm always chooses limited production, i.e. the firm chooses limited
production when β ≥ β∗cL when the sourcing cost is cL, and when β ≥ β
∗
cH
with the sourcing cost
18For instance, Louis Vuitton offers its Monogram Multicolore Marilyn OR with 33 colors all handcrafted on to the
white leather canvas. Louis Vuitton uses a special hand painting or stamping process depending on the type of the
product.
19Timbuk2 bags sold at higher premiums are handmade and customized in a (more-expensive) facility in San
Francisco, rather than being sourced from the overseas supplier in China (Cachon et al 2007).
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is cH . Proposition 12 shows that this unique threshold level is decreasing with the marginal cost
of supply.
Proposition 12. The threshold level for limited production decreases with the marginal cost c of
the supply source. Therefore β∗cH < β
∗
cL
.
Since, the threshold (β∗cH ) under the more expensive supply is lower than the threshold level
(β∗cL) under the cheaper supply, we note the limited production is more prevalent when the supplier
is expensive. This yields three possible positions for the fraction of snobs within the population:
(i) β < β∗cH < β
∗
cL
(Low Intensity). The firm prefers to use regular production when using either
source.
(ii) β∗cH < β < β
∗
cL
(Medium Intensity). The firm prefers to use limited production for the expensive
source, and the regular production strategy for the cheaper source.
(iii) β∗cH < β
∗
cL
< β (High Intensity). The firm prefers to use limited production for both sources.
From Figure 2, we know the scarcity occurs when the production is limited to serve only the
snobs in the market. We focus our attention on the most interesting case (Case (iii)), when the firm
adopts limited production with either source. The other cases offer the same qualitative conclusions,
and are omitted for the sake of brevity.
To analyze the sourcing decisions, we study the profits of the firm as function of the expensive
source cost cH (holding the cost of the cheaper source cL constant). We show that this profit
function is unimodal and attains the global maximum at cH = c∗ ∈ [s, v] (the unique global
minimum is at v). Further, at cH = cequal, the profits using expensive supply matches the profit
using the low cost source.20 This property of the profit function helps us to provide equilibrium
results for a general demand distribution and product costs in Proposition 13. We present the
equilibrium result for the High Intensity region, when the firm prefers to adopt limited production
when using either of the two supply sources, but the results for low-intensity and medium-intensity
are qualitatively similar. Proposition 13 provides conditions under which an expensive option is
chosen by the firm. The specific sourcing decisions are indicated in Figure 4.
Proposition 13. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game when β > β∗cL(> β
∗
cH
) depends on
the following conditions.
1. If cL ≥ c∗, then the firm chooses the cheaper source, sells only to snobs by setting price p∗s
and produces Q∗s. [Region D].
20See Appendix for technical details (Proof of Proposition 13).
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Figure 4: Equilibrium decisions of the firm on which source to use based on given variable cost of
the sources. For illustrative purposes v = 20, s = 5. Note that expensive supply source is chosen
when the low-cost source is cheap. The sourcing choice is employed as a signal for commitment to
scarcity strategy.
2. If cH ≤ c∗, (thus cL ≤ c∗), the firm chooses the more expensive source, and sells only to snobs
by setting p∗s and produces Q
∗
s. [Region A]
3. If cL < c∗ < cH < cequal, the firm chooses the more expensive source, sets p∗s and produces
Q∗s. [Region B].
4. If cL < c∗ < cequal < cH the firm chooses the cheaper source, sets p∗s and produces Q
∗
s. [Region
C].
Figure 4 reveals that a more expensive source may be chosen to signal scarcity in the market.
The firm decides to use the more expensive source,
(i) when the low-cost source is cheap (i.e. cL is low), and
(ii) when the expensive source is (comparatively) not too costly (i.e. ch/cL < cequal/cL).
The latter point is intuitive. We focus on the intriguing first condition (Condition (i)). It is
interesting to note that the firm avoids sourcing from the cheaper source when the source is at
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its cheapest cost. In other words, a sufficiently cost-efficient production process or supply source
will be unused in equilibrium. This is because using a really low-cost supplier is perceived by the
market as a signal that the firm is committing to a high volume of production (low-exclusivity) in
equilibrium.
Thus, contrary to the notions of cost-reduction with sourcing and production, there might be
market scenarios where a firm obtains higher profits by choosing the more expensive source. This
result mirrors the higher marginal cost result of Amaldoss and Jain (2007), which shows, using
reference group effects, that increased marginal costs can improve the profits of a firm. In their
paper, increased costs make the product less attractive to followers, thus leaders (to differentiate
themselves) adopt the product at a lower price (at high volume of sales). Our explanations are
based on demand uncertainty. Given the firm has to make a “bet” on optimal quantity in an
uncertain demand market, the firm with higher sourcing costs produces less goods, because the
marginal cost of unsold goods (c− s) is high. This low inventory in turn increases the valuation for
snobs, and hence, the equilibrium price. Thus, in equilibrium, the firm with higher costs, produces
fewer quantities sold at a higher price. Also note that the limited production strategy and an
expensive supplier need not be employed concurrently in our model.
Thus investment in development, sourcing, and production with higher marginal cost signals
a firm’s commitment to producing exclusive goods. Consumers can rationalize that given the
uncertain demand environment, the firm’s increased investment and production costs can only be
recouped by producing a few exclusive items and selling each of those items at a high margin.
Therefore, the snobs derive a higher utility because of the exclusivity of the product, and expensive
sourcing acts as a signal of ex-ante commitment to exclusivity. Even if the product produced using
the cheaper source is indistinguishable in terms of performance quality, a firm selling conspicuous
goods may prefer to use an expensive source to produce those goods as a commitment to scarcity.
7. Conclusions
This paper attempts to fill the gap in how a firm combines marketing decisions such as pricing
and scarcity strategy with operational decisions such as production and sourcing. In particular, we
model the role stockouts (inventory unavailability) play in the decisions of a firm. Su and Zhang
(2009) show how the cost of customers of not being able to find the product, might force firms to
provide availability guarantee to allay scarcity fears. Our paper takes a different approach. Just as
scarcity may be a signal of product quality (Stock and Balachander 2005), we show in markets with
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uncertain demand, how scarcity may also be used to influence demand and consumer valuations,
especially when some consumers’ decisions are affected by the desire for exclusivity.
We considered an analytical model of a firm selling to a market composed of uncertain number
of snobs and commoners. We calculated the equilibrium pricing, production quantity and market
coverage decisions of the firm, under very general demand uncertainties.
We showed the existence of conspicuous consumption, by itself, does not guarantee scarcity and
low production volumes. In fact, if there are sufficient number of snobs in the market, the firm may
be driven by high margins to produce more goods (because the cost of losing a sale is high).
We provide an explanation for why some firms limit their production before introducing the
product to the market, and others do not, even in uncertain market where demand remains un-
observed. Unlike extant results, our results on limited production are ex-post consistent, i.e. the
commitment the firm can make to limited quantities is credible, and the firm cannot produce and
sell more items after purchasing occurs. Using the limited production results, we consider when
and how firms should adopt the scarcity strategy, and how it is dependent on market parameters
and demand uncertainty.
We find that the scarcity strategy by itself is worthwhile to apply when the fraction of snobs in
the market is neither too high nor too low. For low percentage of snobs, it is not worth excluding
the commoners by charging the snob’s reservation price because the number of snobs is not enough
to overcome the revenues accrued from additional sales. When the fraction of snobs in the market
is too high, the firm is influenced by the margins/underage costs to overproduce. Thus the scarcity
of products occurs only when the fraction of snobs in the market is in the intermediate range. We
provide an analytical identification of the interval of percentage of snobs where scarcity is a more
profitable strategy. This scarcity region is dependent on how the uncertain demand is distributed,
and on the sensitivity of snobs to stockouts.
Finally, we explore why firms adopt more expensive sourcing decisions, incurring upfront higher
costs to produce a functionally equivalent good. We find that when a sequential decision is made
related to sourcing, and then price and production quantity, there emerge scenarios in which the
firm prefers to invest in a more-expensive source when selling to conspicuous consumers. The
firm invests in a source that has higher variable cost, which in turn helps in distinguishing the
firm’s product in terms of exclusivity, even though the utility of the product remains unaltered.
Surprisingly, we find that such a choice of a more expensive sourcing may or may not be employed
in conjunction with scarcity strategies.
Finally, our model is not without its limitations. Ours is a static model in which the firm, snobs,
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and commoners make decisions simultaneously. However, the game could dynamic, and the firms
and consumers could make product decisions periodically over time. In such a dynamic model,
learning about stockouts may play a role in how snobs and commoners make their future decisions.
Some future directions include testing our analytical findings using data from natural or laboratory
experiments. We believe that a careful empirical analysis of the relationship between consumer
characteristics and the impact of stockouts on their buying behavior (cf Anderson et al 2006)
would help us understand how exclusive goods are sold and bought in a market with conspicuous
consumption.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
The RE equilibrium conditions reduce to
p = F̄ (Qs) · (k + v − s) + s (A1)
The producer will obtain the critical fractile quantity choice as:
∂ΠN
∂Q
= (p− s) · P (D > Q∗s)− (c− s) = 0
F̄ (Q∗s) =
c− s
p− s
(A2)
Solving equations (A1) and (A2) provides the equilibrium quantity:
F̄ (Q∗s) =
c− s
p− s
=
c− s
F̄ (Q∗s) · (k + v − s) + s− s
=
c− s
F̄ (Q∗s) · (k + v − s)
⇒ (F̄ (Q∗s))2 = c−sk+v−s
⇒ F̄ (Q∗s) =
√
c−s
k+v−s
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Putting the last term back in (A1) provides the equilibrium price:
p∗s = F̄ (Q
∗
s) · (k + v − s) + s =
√
c− s
k + v − s
· (k + v − s) + s =
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) + s
Proof of Corollary 2:
This result follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1 by taking k to 0. The RE-conditions in
Definition 1 will remain the same. Solving equations for price and stock-out probability together
and applying limit k → 0 lead to the desired results.
Proof of Lemma 3:
We define 4Q(k) = Q∗s(k)−Q0 = F̄−1
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
− F̄−1
(
c−s
v−s
)
. Showing that 4Q(k) is negative
at k = 0 and 4Q(k) strictly increases with k, is sufficient to say that there exists a unique k∗ such
that 4Q(k∗) = 0:
• 4Q(0) < 0 : Note that
√
c−s
v−s >
c−s
v−s since v > c > s. Then, F̄
−1
(√
c−s
v−s
)
< F̄−1
(
c−s
v−s
)
which confirms that 4Q(0) = F̄−1
(√
c−s
v−s
)
− F̄−1
(
c−s
v−s
)
< 0.
• ∂4Q(k)∂k > 0 :
∂4Q(k)
∂k =
∂Q∗s(k)
∂k = −
1
2
√
c−s
(k+v−s)3/2
1
−f(F̄−1(
√
c−s
k+v−s ))
= 12
√
c−s
(k+v−s)3/2
1
f(F̄−1(
√
c−s
k+v−s ))
Note that
√
c− s > 0 and k + v − s > 0 since v > c > s and k > 0. Then, ∂4Q(k)∂k > 0.
Thus, there exists an unique k∗ such that 4Q(k∗) = 0:
Q∗s(k
∗)−Q0 = 0
⇒ F̄−1
(√
c−s
k∗+v−s
)
= F̄−1
(
c−s
v−s
)
⇒
√
c−s
k∗+v−s =
c−s
v−s
⇒ k∗ = (v−s)·(v−c)c−s
4Q(0) < 0 and ∂4Q(k)∂k > 0 imply that 4Q(k) changes sign only at k
∗ as k increases. It is easy
to show that the same threshold, k∗, holds for the relation between p∗s and p0. This leads to the
following result:
i ) Q∗s < Q0 and p
∗
s < p0 when k <
(v−s)·(v−c)
c−s
ii ) Q∗s > Q0 and p
∗
s > p0 when k >
(v−s)·(v−c)
c−s
Proof of Proposition 4(1):
The producer sets the reservation price of snobs so the commoners are excluded from consideration
(βD instead of β). The RE equilibrium conditions reduce to
p = F̄βD(Q∗s) · (k + v − s) + s = P (β ·D > Q∗s) · (k + v − s) + s (A3)
28
The producer will obtain the critical fractile quantity choice as:
∂ΠN
∂Q
= (p− s) · P (β ·D > Q)− (c− s) = 0
P (β ·D > Q∗s) =
c− s
p− s
(A4)
Solving equations (A3) and (A4) provides the equilibrium quantity:
F̄βD(Q∗s) =
c− s
p− s
=
c− s
F̄βD(Q∗s) · (k + v − s) + s− s
=
c− s
F̄βD(Q∗s) · (k + v − s)
⇒ (F̄βD(Q∗s))2 = c−sk+v−s
⇒ F̄βD(Q∗s) =
√
c−s
k+v−s
Putting the last term back in (A3) provides the equilibrium price:
p∗s = F̄βD(Q
∗
s) · (k + v − s) + s =
√
c− s
k + v − s
· (k + v − s) + s =
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) + s
Proof of Proposition 4(2):
The RE equilibrium conditions reduce to
p = F̄D(Q∗c) · (v − s) + s = P (D > Q∗c) · (v − s) + s (A5)
The producer will obtain the critical fractile quantity choice as:
∂ΠN
∂Q
= (p− s) · P (D > Q∗c)− (c− s) = 0
P (D > Q∗c) =
c− s
p− s
(A6)
Solving equations A5 and A6 provides the equilibrium quantity:
F̄D(Q∗c) =
c− s
p− s
=
c− s
F̄D(Q∗c) · (v − s) + s− s
=
c− s
F̄D(Q∗c) · (v − s)
⇒ (F̄D(Q∗c))2 = c−sv−s
⇒ F̄D(Q∗c) =
√
c−s
v−s
Putting the last term back in (A5) provides the equilibrium price:
p∗c = F̄D(Q
∗
c) · (v − s) + s =
√
c− s
v − s
· (v − s) + s =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) + s
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Proof of Lemma 5:
We show that the difference between profits obtained from “Limited” and “Regular” production
changes sign only at a unique threshold of snobs, β∗, as β increases. Recall the implicit formulation
of Q∗s from Proposition 4(1). This leads to the following explicit solution:
Q∗s = βF̄
−1
D
(√
c− s
k + v − s
)
Then, the optimal profit of the producer is:
Π∗N,s =
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) · E[min{β ·D,Q∗s}]− (c− s) ·Q∗s
=
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) ·
∫ Q∗sβ
0
β · u · fD(u) · du+
∫ ∞
Q∗s
β
Q∗s · fD(u) · du
− (c− s) ·Q∗s
=
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s)
0
β · u · fD(u) · du
Recall the implicit formulation of Q∗c from Proposition 4(2). This leads to the following explicit
solution:
Q∗c = F̄
−1
D
(√
c− s
v − s
)
Then the optimal profit of the producer is:
Π∗N,c =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) · E[min{D,Q∗c}]− (c− s) ·Q∗c
=
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
(∫ Q∗c
0
u · fD(u) · du+
∫ ∞
Q∗c
Q∗c · fD(u) · du
)
− (c− s) ·Q∗c
=
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
We define Π∗N,s(β) to represent the producer’s optimal profit function when limited production
strategy is applied given that the percentage of snobs is β. We assume that Q∗s(β) > 0 except for
β = 0 and Q∗c > 0 without loss of generality. Also, we define 4Π(β) = Π∗N,s(β)−Π∗N,c. Note that β
is in the domain [0,1]. Then, showing that 4Π(β) is negative at β = 0, 4Π(β) is positive at β = 1
and 4Π(β) strictly increases in β is sufficient to say that there exists β∗ such that 4Π(β∗) = 0:
• 4Π(0) < 0 :
4Π(0) = Π∗N,s(0)−Π∗N,c
= −Π∗N,c
= −
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
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√
(c− s)(v − s) is positive since v > c > s. The support of D is non-negative and Q∗c > 0.
Then, the last term of the equality above must be non-positive.
• 4Π(1) > 0 :
4Π(1) = Π∗N,s(1)−Π∗N,c
=
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
−
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
√
(c− s)(v − s) ≤
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) since k ≥ 0. Also, F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
≤ F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
,
since
√
c−s
v−s ≥
√
c−s
k+v−s . Then, the last equality above must be positive.
• ∂4Π(β)∂β > 0 :
∂4Π(β)
∂β
=
∂Π∗N,s(β)
∂β
=
√
(c− s) · (k + v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
The first term of the last equality is positive since v > c > s and k ≥ 0. The support of D is
non-negative and Q∗s(β)/β > 0. Then, the last equality above must be positive.
Then, there exists a unique root β∗ such that 4Π(β∗) = 0:
⇒ Π∗N,s(β∗)−Π∗N,c = 0
⇒
√
c− s(
√
k + v − s · β∗
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
−
√
v − s ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du) = 0
⇒ β∗ =
√
v − s
k + v − s
·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
u · fD(u) du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
u · fD(u) du
4Π(0) < 0, 4Π(1) > 0, and ∂4Π(β)∂β > 0 imply that 4Π(β) changes sign only at β
∗ as β increases.
This leads to the following result:
• Π∗N,s < Π∗N,c when β < β∗
• Π∗N,s > Π∗N,c when β > β∗
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Follows from the results of Lemma 5. If β < β∗ then it is more profitable to apply the “Regular
Production” strategy since Π∗N,s < Π
∗
N,c and if β > β
∗ then it is more profitable to apply the
“Limited Production” strategy since Π∗N,s > Π
∗
N,c.
Proof of Proposition 7:
We show that the difference between Q∗s and Q
∗
c changes sign only at a particular threshold level, βQ,
as β increases. We define Q∗s(β) as the equilibrium quantity choice under the limited production
strategy when snobs allocate β percentage of the market. We assume that Q∗s(β) > 0 except
for β = 0 and Q∗c > 0 without loss of generality. Also, we define 4Q(β) = Q∗s(β) − Q∗c =
βF̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
− F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. Then, showing that 4Q(0) < 0, 4Q(1) > 0, and ∂4Q(β)∂β > 0 is
sufficient to say there exists unique βQ such that 4Q(βQ) = 0:
• 4Q(0) < 0 : 4Q(0) = −F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
is positive since we assume that the
support of D is non-negative and Q∗c > 0. Then, 4Q(0) < 0.
• 4Q(1) > 0 : 4Q(1) = F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
− F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. We show that F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
>
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
within the proof of Lemma 5. Then, 4Q(1) > 0.
• ∂4Q(β)∂β > 0 :
∂4Q(β)
∂β =
∂Q∗s
∂β = F̄
−1
D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
> 0
The inequality follows directly from the assumption that the support of D is non-negative
and Q∗s(β)/β > 0. Then,
∂4Q(β)
∂β > 0.
Then, there exists a unique root βQ such that 4Q(βQ) = 0:
⇒ Q∗s(βQ)−Q∗c = 0
⇒ βQF̄−1D
(√
c− s
k + v − s
)
− F̄−1D
(√
c− s
v − s
)
= 0
⇒ βQ =
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
4Q(0) < 0, 4Q(1) > 0, and ∂4Q(β)∂β > 0 imply that 4Q(β) changes sign only at βQ as β increases.
This leads to the following result:
• Q∗s < Q∗c when β < βQ
• Q∗s > Q∗c when β > βQ
Before we prove more results, we prove Proposition A1.
Proposition A1. βQ is larger than or equal to β∗ when xy ≥
F̄D(y)
F̄D(x)
.
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Proof of Proposition A1:
We show that βQ is larger than or equal to β∗ for given parameters (s,c,v and k) under a particular
condition. We define % = F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
and ω = F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
for simplification of the system.
Rewriting β∗ and βQ with the new notation leads to the following equations:
βQ =
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
) = %
ω
β∗ =
√
v − s
k + v − s
·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
u · fD(u) du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
u · fD(u) du
=
√
c−s
k+v−s√
c−s
v−s
·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
u · fD(u) du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
u · fD(u) du
=
F̄D
(
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
))
F̄D
(
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
u · fD(u) du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
u · fD(u) du
=
F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
∫ %
0
u · fD(u) du∫ ω
0
u · fD(u) du
The last line can be further reduced to the following equation by applying integration by parts on
the numerator and the denominator of the second term:
β∗ =
F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
u · FD(u) |%0 −
∫ %
0 FD(u) du
u · FD(u) |ω0 −
∫ ω
0 FD(u) du
=
F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
%FD(%)−
∫ %
0 (1− FD(u)) du
ωFD(ω)−
∫ ω
0 (1− FD(u)) du
=
F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
∫ %
0 F̄D(u) du− %F̄D(%)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
Showing that βQ − β∗ ≥ 0 is sufficient for the validity of the claim:
βQ − β∗ =
%
ω
− F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
∫ %
0 F̄D(u) du− %F̄D(%)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
Recall that, in the Proof of Lemma 5, we showed both the first and the second term of β∗ are less
than or equal to 1 and non-negative. Thus, eliminating the second term will provide us a lower
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bound for βQ − β∗:
βQ − β∗ =
%
ω
− F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
·
∫ %
0 F̄D(u) du− %F̄D(%)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
≥ %
ω
− F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
Therefore, we have shown that βQ is larger than or equal to β∗ if %ω ≥
F̄D(ω)
F̄D(%)
for given parameters
(s,c,v and k).
Before we prove our main results on Myopic customers, we prove the following Proposition A2
and Lemma A3.
Proposition A2 (Limited Production). In the RE equilibrium under limited production, all snobs
will try to buy in the current period, and the firm’s price and quantity choices are characterized by
F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k and p
∗
s,my =
v+s+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2 .
Proof of Proposition A2:
The RE equilibrium conditions reduce to
p = v + kF̄βD(Q∗s,my) (A7)
The producer will obtain the critical fractile quantity choice as:
∂ΠN
∂Q
= (p− s) · P (βD > Q∗s,my)− (c− s) = 0
F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
c− s
p− s
(A8)
Solving equations (A7) and (A8) provides the following quadratic equation:
F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
c− s
p− s
=
c− s
v + kF̄βD(Q∗s,my)− s
⇒ vF̄βD(Q∗s,my) + k(F̄βD(Q∗s,my))2 − sF̄βD(Q∗s,my) = c− s
⇒ k(F̄βD(Q∗s,my))2 + (v − s)F̄βD(Q∗s,my)− (c− s) = 0
Two real value solutions to this quadratic equation can be obtained easily by the quadratic formula:
F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
−(v − s)±
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2k
(A9)
Recall that s < c < v. Then, one of the solutions, F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
−(v−s)−
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2k , is
infeasible since the survival function must always be non-negative. This leaves one solution which
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provides the equilibrium quantity:
F̄βD(Q∗s,my) =
−(v − s) +
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2k
(A10)
Putting (A10) back in (A7) provides the equilibrium price:
p∗s,my = v + kF̄βD(Q
∗
s,my)
= v + k
−(v − s) +
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2k
= v +
−(v − s) +
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
=
v + s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
Before we proceed with more results, we prove Lemma A3. Let Π∗N,mySn denote the firm’s
optimal profit obtained under the Limited Production strategy, and Π∗N,c denote the firm’s optimal
profit obtained under the Regular Production strategy.
Lemma A3. There exists a unique threshold of snobs, β∗mySn, where Π
∗
N,mySn < Π
∗
N,c when β <
βmySn and Π∗N,mySn > Π
∗
N,c when β > βmySn. The unique threshold level is
β∗mySn =
√
(c− s)(v − s)
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
ufD(u) du
(v−s)+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
ufD(u) du
Proof of Lemma A3: We show that the difference between profits obtained from “Limited” and
“Regular” production changes sign only at a unique threshold of snobs, β∗mySn, as β increases.
Recall the implicit formulation of Q∗s,my from proposition A2. This leads to the following explicit
solution:
Q∗s,my = βF̄
−1
D
(√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)− (v − s)
2k
)
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Then, the optimal profit of the producer is:
Π∗N,mySn =
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
· E[min{β ·D,Q∗s,my}]− (c− s) ·Q∗s,my
=
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
·
∫ Q∗s,myβ
0
β · u · fD(u) · du+
∫ ∞
Q∗
mySn
β
Q∗s,my · fD(u) · du

− (c− s) ·Q∗s,my
=
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
·
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
β · u · fD(u) · du
We know the implicit solution of Q∗c and the optimal profit of the producer under regular
production strategy from the previous setting:
Q∗c = F̄
−1
D
(√
c− s
v − s
)
Π∗N,c =
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
We define Π∗N,mySn(β) to represent the producer’s optimal profit function when limited pro-
duction strategy is applied given that the percentage of snobs is β. Again, we assume that
Q∗mySn(β) > 0 except for β = 0 and Q
∗
c > 0 without loss of generality. Also, we define 4Π(β) =
Π∗N,mySn(β)− Π∗N,c. Note that β is in the domain [0,1]. Then, showing that 4Π(β) is negative at
β = 0, 4Π(β) is positive at β = 1 and 4Π(β) strictly increases in β is sufficient to say that there
exists β∗mySn such that 4Π(β∗) = 0:
• 4Π(0) < 0 :
4Π(0) = Π∗N,mySn(0)−Π∗N,c
= −Π∗N,c
= −
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
√
(c− s)(v − s) is positive since v > c > s. The support of D is non-negative and Q∗c > 0.
Then, the last term of the equality above must be non-positive.
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• 4Π(1) > 0 :
4Π(1) = Π∗N,mySn(1)−Π∗N,c
=
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
·
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
β · u · fD(u) · du
−
√
(c− s) · (v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du
Claim: v−s+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2 ≥
√
(c− s)(v − s) when s < c < v.√
(v−s)2
4 + k(c− s) +
v−s
2
Take square⇒ (v−s)
2
4 + k(c− s) + (v− s)
√
(v−s)2
4 + k(c− s) +
(v−s)2
4
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + (v − s)
√
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + (v − s)
2
4
=
(v − s)2
2
+ k(c− s) +
√
(v − s)4
4
+ k(c− s)(v − s)2
= k(c− s) + (v − s)
2
2
+
(v − s)2
2
√
1 + 4k
(c− s)
(v − s)2
> k(c− s) + (v − s)2
Taking square root of both sides, we have obtained the following inequality,√
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + v − s
2
>
√
k(c− s) + (v − s)2
√
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + v − s
2
>
√
k(c− s) + (v − s)2 >
√
k(c− s) + (v − s)(c− s)√
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + v − s
2
>
√
(k + v − s)(c− s) (A11)
Hence, we have shown that the claim holds when s < c < v.
Claim:
√
c−s
v−s ≥
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k when s < c < v.
We use (A11) to show that the claim holds.√
(v − s)2
4
+ k(c− s) + v − s
2
>
√
(k + v − s)(c− s)
c− s√
(v−s)2
4 + k(c− s) +
v−s
2
<
c− s√
(k + v − s)(c− s)
c− s√
(v−s)2
4 + k(c− s) +
v−s
2
<
√
c− s
k + v − s
(A12)
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Thus,
√
(c− s)(v − s) ≤ v−s+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2 by (A11). Also, F̄
−1
D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
≤ F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
,
since
√
c−s
v−s ≥
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k by (A12). Then, 4Π(1) must be positive.
• ∂4Π(β)∂β > 0 :
∂4Π(β)
∂β
=
∂Π∗N,mySn(β)
∂β
=
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
·
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
u · fD(u) · du
The first term of the last equality is positive since v > c > s and k ≥ 0. Also, Q∗s,my/β > 0.
Then, the last equality above must be positive.
Then, there exists a unique root β∗mySn such that 4Π(β∗mySn) = 0:
⇒ Π∗N,mySn(β∗mySn)−Π∗N,c = 0
⇒
v − s+
√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)
2
β∗mySn
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
u · fD(u) · du
−
√
(c− s)(v − s) ·
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0
u · fD(u) · du) = 0
⇒ β∗mySn =
√
(c− s)(v − s)
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
u · fD(u) du
v−s+
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)
2
∫ F̄−1D (√(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)2k )
0
u · fD(u) · du
4Π(0) < 0, 4Π(1) > 0, and ∂4Π(β)∂β > 0 imply that 4Π(β) changes sign only at β
∗
mySn as β
increases. This leads to the following result:
• Π∗N,mySn < Π∗N,c when β < β∗mySn
• Π∗N,mySn > Π∗N,c when β > β∗mySn
Proof of Proposition 8:
Follows from the results of Lemma A3. If β < β∗mySn then it is more profitable to apply the Regular
Production strategy since Π∗N,mySn < Π
∗
N,c and if β > β
∗
mySn then it is more profitable to apply the
Limited Production strategy since Π∗N,mySn > Π
∗
N,c.
Before we prove more results, we prove Proposition A4.
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Proposition A4. There exists another unique level of percentage of snobs, βQ,mySn, where Q∗mySn <
Qc when β < βQ,mySn and Q∗mySn > Qc when β > βQ,mySn. This unique threshold level is
βQ,mySn =
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
We realize that βQ,mySn < βQ since F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
≤ F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
as
√
c−s
k+v−s ≥
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k by (A12).
Proof of Proposition A4:
We show that the difference between Q∗s,my and Qc changes sign only at a particular thresh-
old level, βQ,mySn, as β increases. We define Q∗s,my(β) as the equilibrium quantity choice under
the limited production strategy when snobs allocate β percentage of the market. We assume
that Q∗s,my(β) > 0 except for β = 0 and Qc > 0. Also, we define 4Q(β) = Q∗s,my(β) − Qc =
βF̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
− F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. Then, showing that 4Q(0) < 0, 4Q(1) > 0, and
∂4Q(β)
∂β > 0 is sufficient to say there exists unique βQ such that 4Q(βQ) = 0:
• 4Q(0) < 0 : 4Q(0) = −F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
is positive since we assume that the
support of D is non-negative and Q∗c > 0. Then, 4Q(0) < 0.
• 4Q(1) > 0 :4Q(1) = F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
−F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
. F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
>
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
since
√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k <
√
c−s
v−s by equation (A12) within the proof of
Lemma A3. Then, 4Q(1) > 0.
• ∂4Q(β)∂β > 0 :
∂4Q(β)
∂β =
∂Q∗s,my
∂β = F̄
−1
D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
> 0
The inequality follows directly from the assumption that the support of D is non-negative
and Q∗s,my > 0. Then,
∂4Q(β)
∂β > 0.
Then, there exists a unique root βQ,mySn such that 4Q(βQ,mySn) = 0:
⇒ Q∗mySn(βQ,mySn)−Qc = 0
⇒ βQ,mySnF̄−1D
(√
(v − s)2 + 4k(c− s)− (v − s)
2k
)
− F̄−1D
(√
c− s
v − s
)
= 0
⇒ βQ,mySn =
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
(v−s)2+4k(c−s)−(v−s)
2k
)
4Q(0) < 0, 4Q(1) > 0, and ∂4Q(β)∂β > 0 imply that 4Q(β) changes sign only at βQ as β increases.
This leads to the following result:
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• Q∗s,my < Qc when β < βQ
• Q∗s,my > Qc when β > βQ
Proof of Lemma 9:
We show that for higher k, Q∗s increases more steeply in β. Recall Q
∗
s = βF̄
−1
D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
from the
proof of Lemma 5. In Proposition 7, we show that ∂Q
∗
s
∂β = F̄
−1
D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
. What we need to show
now is that the partial derivative of ∂Q
∗
s
∂β with respect to k is positive:
∂2Q∗s
∂β∂k
= −1
2
·
√
c− s
(k + v − s)
3
2
· 1
−fD(F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
)
=
1
2
·
√
c− s
(k + v − s)
3
2
· 1
fD(F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
)
The term,
√
c−s
(k+v−s)
3
2
, is positive by the assumptions v > c > s and k > 0. Then, ∂
2Q∗s
∂β∂k > 0.
Therefore, we have shown that for higher k, Q∗s increases more steeply in β.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Follows directly from showing that the first derivatives of both threshold levels (β∗ and βQ) with
respect to k are negative:
• ∂β
∗
∂k = −
1
2
√
v−s
k+v−s
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
v−s )
0 ufD(u)du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
 1
k+v−s +
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
√
c−s
(k+v−s)
3
2
 < 0
The terms,
√
v−s
k+v−s and
√
c−s
(k+v−s)
3
2
, are positive by the assumptions v > c > s and k > 0. In
Proposition 7, we show that both F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s) and F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
k+v−s) are positive so both terms
within the parentheses are positive as well. Then, ∂β
∗
∂k < 0.
• ∂βQ∂k = −
1
2
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)2 1
fD(F̄
−1
D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
)
√
c−s
(k+v−s)
3
2
< 0
Follows directly from the proof of the previous point.
Therefore, we have shown that the threshold levels, β∗ and βQ, decrease with increase in sensitivity
to stock-out, k.
Proof of Proposition 11:
We derive the conditions under which the the region of scarcity (i.e. βQ − β∗) expands as snobs
become more sensitive to stockouts. We define 4β′(k) = ∂β
∗
∂k −
∂βQ
∂k . We will use the same notation,
% and ω, which we used in the proof of Proposition A1. Showing that 4β(k) is negative for all k
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in [0,∞) is sufficient for proving the proposition.
4β′(k) = −1
2
√
v − s
k + v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0 ufD(u)du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
 1
k + v − s
+
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
√
c− s
(k + v − s)
3
2

+
1
2
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
v−s
)
F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)2 1
fD(F̄−1D
(√
c−s
k+v−s
)
)
√
c− s
(k + v − s)
3
2
= −1
2
1
k + v − s
 F̄D(ω)F̄D(%) ·
∫ %
0
u · fD(u) du∫ ω
0
u · fD(u) du
(
1 +
ω∫ ω
0 ufD(u)du
F̄D(ω)
)
− %
ω
1
ω
F̄D(ω)
fD(ω)

= −1
2
1
k + v − s
(
β∗
(
1 +
ω∫ ω
0 ufD(u)du
F̄D(ω)
)
− βQ
1
ω
F̄D(ω)
fD(ω)
)
= −1
2
1
k + v − s
(
β∗
(
1 +
ωF̄D(ω)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
)
− βQ
1
ω
F̄D(ω)
fD(ω)
)
(Int. by parts)
= −1
2
1
k + v − s
(
β∗
( ∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
)
− βQ
1
ω
F̄D(ω)
fD(ω)
)
The last equality is less than or equal to zero if and only if the equation in parentheses is non-
negative. We know from the proofs of lemma 5 and proposition 7 that all terms within the paren-
theses is non-negative. Thus, we require a sufficient condition that will make the equation in
parentheses non-negative:
β∗
( ∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)
)
− βQ
1
ω
F̄D(ω)
fD(ω)
≥ 0
⇒ ωfD(ω)
F̄D(ω)
≥
βQ
β∗
∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du
⇒ ωh(ω) ≥
βQ
β∗
∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du− ωF̄D(ω)∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du
(h(ω) = f(ω)/F̄D(ω); the hazard rate of D)
=
βQ
β∗
M(Q∗s/β) (since ω = Q
∗
s/β)
We define the hazard rate of D above as h(.) (see Bryson and Siddiqui 1969 for details). The second
term on the right-hand side of the inequality is less than or equal to 1 since
∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du−ωF̄D(ω) ≤∫ ω
0 F̄D(u) du and ω ≥ 0. The right hand side of the inequality can be more than or less than or
equal to 1 depending on the relation between the first and the second term. Implicit sufficient
conditions can be similarly obtained in this case.
Proof of Proposition 12:
We show that the threshold level for limited production decreases with the marginal cost of the
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supply c. Recall that β∗ =
√
v−s
k+v−s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s)
0 ufD(u)du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s)
0 ufD(u)du
is defined ∀c ∈ [s, v] from Lemma 5.
Showing that the first derivative of β∗ with respect to c is non-positive will be sufficient for the
argument:
∂β∗
∂c
=
√
v − s
k + v − s
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
v−s))
−1
2
√
(c−s)(v−s)
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
v−s ))
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
(
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du)2
−
√
v − s
k + v − s
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
k+v−s))
−1
2
√
(c−s)(k+v−s)
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
k+v−s ))
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0 ufD(u)du
(
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du)2
=
√
v − s
k + v − s
1
(
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du)2
1
2
√
c− s
·
 F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)√
k + v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
ufD(u)du−
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)√
v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
ufD(u)du

Terms outside the parentheses are positive since s < c < v and D has a non-negative support.
Thus, the last equality is non-positive if and only if terms in the parentheses give non-positive
value. Analysis of the terms in parentheses will provide the sufficient and necessary condition:
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)√
k + v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
ufD(u)du −
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)√
v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
ufD(u)du ≤ 0
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)√
k + v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0
ufD(u)du ≤
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)√
v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0
ufD(u)du
√
v − s
k + v − s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv−s )
0 ufD(u)du∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sk+v−s )
0 ufD(u)du
≤
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
v−s)
F̄−1D (
√
c−s
k+v−s)
β∗ ≤ βQ
Recall that we provide one sufficient condition in Proposition A1 for the last inequality to hold.
Then, this is sufficient to say that ∂β
∗
∂c ≤ 0. We have shown that the threshold level for limited
production decreases with the marginal cost of the supply c. Therefore, the threshold level for the
more expensive source, β∗cH , is less than the threshold level for the cheaper source, β
∗
cL
. Simply,
β∗cH < β
∗
cL
since cL < cH .
Proof of Proposition 13:
We derive the conditions which dictate the choice of the source by the profit maximizing producer
for the high intensity region. We define v′ = v + k without loss of generality. (Proof for the
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low intensity region can be obtained by setting k = 0 and β = 1). To generalize our results for
all demand distributions, we derive the structure of the profit function for changing cost of the
supplier. We show that there exists a global maximum at c∗, at least one inflection point in (c∗, v′),
and a global minimum at v′. Recall Π∗N,s(c) from the proof of Lemma 5 that stands for the optimal
profit of the producer experiencing high intensity of snobs under limited production strategy:
Π∗N,s(c) =
√
(c− s)(v′ − s)β
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv′−s )
0
ufD(u)du
Π∗N,s(c) is a continuous function on the closed interval [s, v
′], and differentiable on the open interval
(s, v′), where s < v′. Note that Π∗N,s(s) = 0 and Π
∗
N,s(v
′) = 0. Then, there exists at least one c∗
in (s, v′) such that
∂Π∗N,s(c
∗)
∂c = 0 by the mean value theorem. Now that we show there must be at
least one extreme point within (s, v′), the next step is to show that there can only be one extreme
point which is a global maximum in (s, v′). We check the first derivative of Π∗N,s(c) with respect to
c:
∂ΠN,s(c)
∂c
=
β
2
√
v′ − s
c− s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv′−s )
0
ufD(u)du−
βF̄−1D
(√
c−s
v′−s
)
2
=
β
2
√
v′ − s
c− s
−F̄−1D (√ c− sv′ − s)F̄D(F̄−1D (
√
c− s
v′ − s
)) +
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du
− βF̄−1D
(√
c−s
v′−s
)
2
(Int. by parts)
=
β
2
√
v′ − s
c− s
∫ F̄−1D (√ c−sv′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du− βF̄−1D
(√
c− s
v′ − s
)
Any extreme point c∗ in [s, v′] must satisfy ∂ΠN,s(c
∗)
∂c = 0:
∫ F̄−1D (√ c∗−sv′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du = 2F̄−1D
(√
c∗ − s
v′ − s
)√
c∗ − s
v′ − s
(A13)
We check the sign of the second derivative of Π∗N,s(c) with respect to c at the possible extreme
points:
∂2ΠN,s(c)
∂c2
=
−β
4
√
v′ − s
(c− s)3/2
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
v′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du
+
β
2
√
v′ − s
c− s F̄D
(
F̄−1D (
√
c− s
v′ − s )
)
−1
2
1√
(c− s)(v′ − s)
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
v′−s ))
− β
2
−1√
(c− s)(v′ − s)
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
v′−s ))
=
β
4
1√
(c− s)(v′ − s)
−v′ − s
c− s
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c−s
v′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du+
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c−s
v′−s ))

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∂2ΠN,s(c
∗)
∂c2
=
1
4
β√
(c∗ − s)(v′ − s)
− v′ − s
c∗ − s
∫ F̄−1
D
(
√
c∗−s
v′−s )
0
F̄D(u)du+
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c∗−s
v′−s ))

=
1
4
β√
(c∗ − s)(v′ − s)
− v′ − s
c∗ − s2F̄
−1
D
(√
c∗ − s
v′ − s
)√
c∗ − s
v′ − s +
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c∗−s
v′−s ))
 (by (A13))
=
1
4
β√
(c∗ − s)(v′ − s)
−2F̄−1D
(√
c∗−s
v′−s
)
√
c∗−s
v′−s
+
1
fD(F̄
−1
D (
√
c∗−s
v′−s ))

Terms outside the parentheses are positive since s < c < v′. Thus, the sign of the last equality is
dictated by the terms in the parentheses. We define F̄−1D
(√
c∗−s
v′−s
)
= ξ∗. Note that ∂ξ
∗
∂c∗ ≤ 0. The
analysis of the terms in the parentheses reveals the following result:
−
2F̄−1D
(√
c∗−s
v′−s
)
√
c∗−s
v′−s
+
1
fD(F̄−1D (
√
c∗−s
v′−s ))
= − 2ξ
∗
F̄D(ξ∗)
+
1
fD(ξ∗)
=
1
fD(ξ∗)
(
−2fD(ξ
∗)ξ∗
F̄D(ξ∗)
+ 1
)
Hence, the structure of the function at the potential extreme point is dictated by the following
conditions:
• ∂
2ΠN,s(c
∗)
∂c2
< 0 if and only if fD(ξ
∗)ξ∗
F̄D(ξ∗)
> 12
• ∂
2ΠN,s(c
∗)
∂c2
> 0 if and only if fD(ξ
∗)ξ∗
F̄D(ξ∗)
< 12
• ∂
2ΠN,s(c
∗)
∂c2
= 0 if and only if fD(ξ
∗)ξ∗
F̄D(ξ∗)
= 12
Recall that the demand in our model has an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) property.
Then, when we move from a potential extreme point to a higher potential extreme point, g(ξ∗)
must decrease since ξ∗ decreases with c∗. This property eliminates the possibility of more than one
combination of local maximum and local minimum in (s, v′).
We know that Π∗N,s(s) = 0, Π
∗
N,s(v
′) = 0 and Π∗N,s(c) > 0 in (s, v
′). Note that ∂ΠN,s(s)∂c and
∂2ΠN,s(s)
∂c2
are undefined so the function might be tangent at s since we know that the function
is continuous and differentiable in (s, v′). Since limc→s+
∂2ΠN,s(c)
∂c2
< 0, the function can only be
increasing concave after s. Having increasing concave structure ∀c ∈ (s, s+ ε) implies that the first
extreme point in (s, v′) can either be an inflection point or a local maximum.
It is easy to show that the first extreme point can not be an inflection point by contradiction.
Having inflection point first as an extreme point would imply that there exists no local maximum
since g(ξ) can not attain values larger than 1/2 anymore. This contradicts with the fact that
function returns back to 0 at v′. Thus, the first extreme point must be a local maximum which
we state as c∗. Since there is no possibility of more than one combination of local maximum and
local minimum in (s, v′), next possible set of extreme points after c∗ is a set of inflection points
plus a local minimum point. In fact, it can be immediately shown that there exists at least one
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inflection point in (c∗, v′) by the mean value theorem. Hence, the unique local minimum is v′ since
∂ΠN,s(v
′)
∂c = 0 and
∂2ΠN,s(v
′)
∂c2
> 0.
We have shown that Π∗N,s reaches a global maximum at c
∗, has at least one inflection point in
(c∗, v′), and reaches a global minimum at v′.
Therefore,
1. If (cH >)cL ≥ c∗ then Π∗N,s(cL) ≥ Π∗N,s(cH). [Region D]
2. If (cL <)cH ≤ c∗ then Π∗N,s(cL) ≤ Π∗N,s(cH). [Region A]
3. If cL < c∗ < cH < cequal then Π∗N,s(cL) ≤ Π∗N,s(cH). [Region B]
4. If cL < c∗ < cequal < cH then Π∗N,s(cL) ≥ Π∗N,s(cH). [Region C]
where Π∗N,s(cL) = Π
∗
N,s(cH) when cH = cequal.
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